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Abstract 
How is it that we know what a dog and a tree are, or, for that matter, what knowledge is? Our semantic memory 
consists of knowledge about the world, including concepts, facts and beliefs. This knowledge is essential for 
recognizing entities and objects, and for making inferences and predictions about the world. In essence, our 
semantic knowledge determines how we understand and interact with the world around us. In this chapter, we 
examine semantic memory from cognitive, sensorimotor, cognitive neuroscientific, and computational perspectives. 
We consider the cognitive and neural processes (and biases) that allow people to learn and represent concepts, 
and discuss how and where in the brain sensory and motor information may be integrated to allow for the 
perception of a coherent “concept”. We suggest that our understanding of semantic memory can be enriched by 
considering how semantic knowledge develops across the lifespan within individuals.  
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1. What is semantic memory? 
What do psychologists mean when they use the 
term semantic memory? Almost half a century ago, in 
1972, Endel Tulving suggested partitioning the human 
long-term memory system into two distinct stores: an 
episodic store that contains memories that are linked to 
a particular time and place (e.g., where you parked your 
bicycle this morning), and a semantic store that 
contains more general knowledge about the world (e.g., 
what a bicycle looks like, or is used for). Tulving’s 
proposal was widely adopted, and now many 
psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists consider 
episodic and semantic memory to be components of the 
declarative (or explicit) branch of the long-term memory 
system. Motor knowledge about how you actually ride a 
bicycle, in contrast, is generally described as a 
procedural skill that is part of another branch of long-
term memory—the non-declarative, or implicit memory 
system. This system encompasses knowledge to which 
we do not have conscious access, but that nevertheless 
affects our behavior (Squire, 1987). 
Early neuropsychological evidence supported the 
view that episodic memory is distinct from implicit 
memory, and is at least partially distinct from semantic 
memory. Amnesic individuals (i.e., people with episodic 
memory deficits) for example, are able to learn new 
procedural skills (e.g., maze solving and mirror reading, 
Cohen & Squire, 1980; Milner et al., 1968) and acquire 
some new semantic knowledge (e.g., the names of new 
famous people; O’Kane et al., 2004), despite having no 
episodic memory of having learned these things. 
Although such neuropsychological evidence does 
suggest that episodic, semantic, and implicit memory 
systems are at least partially distinct, there is also 
evidence that the semantic system is not completely 
independent of either episodic or implicit knowledge. In 
fact, detailed behavioral, computational, and 
neuroimaging investigations suggest that semantic 
memory is part of an integrated memory system – a 
system that is grounded in the sensory, perceptual, and 
motor systems, and that is distributed across multiple 
brain regions. In other words, there is now good 
evidence (some of which we describe later in this 
chapter) that there is in fact no strict division between 
semantic memory and the sensory, motor, and episodic 
information from which semantic information is acquired 
originally.  
In what follows, we discuss semantic memory from 
cognitive, sensorimotor, cognitive neuroscientific, and 
computational perspectives. Although much of the 
presentation focuses on semantic memory for concrete 
objects, along the way we will see that many of the 
same issues that concern concrete objects are also 
relevant for abstract concepts, actions, and events, as 
well as for the features of each of these. 
2. What is semantic memory for? 
Imagine seeing something, say a dog, for the very 
first time. It has various attributes, such as a particular 
shape, motion, smell, sound, color, feel, fur length, and 
collar. When you see the same animal again a week 
later, its fur length and smell might be different (perhaps 
it has recently been bathed and groomed), and it might 
be wearing a different collar. But its shape, motion, 
color and bark are the same. Thus, across your two 
experiences with the animal, some attributes were more 
constant (shape, sound, color) than others (fur length, 
smell and collar). By being sensitive to the frequency of 
the animal’s various attributes across episodes of 
experiencing it, you might derive (or abstract) a 
representation of the concept dog (we use the label 
“dog” for convenience, but the same process would 
work for an animal we do not have a name for) in which 
the aspects that are most commonly shared across 
those episodes are most heavily weighted, and the 
aspects that those episodes share less frequently have 
less weight. 
The regularities gleaned via the process of 
abstraction allow generalization based on this concept. 
Therefore, when we see another thing for the first time, 
to the extent that the new thing’s attributes are similar to 
those that are included in our concept (and taking into 
account the weights), we can link that new thing with 
the dog concept we formed earlier. Thus, another furry, 
four legged barking animal would be more strongly 
associated with the concept dog than would a cat, 
which would in turn be more strongly associated with 
the concept than would a table or a lemon. 
Furthermore, once we have associated the new animal 
with our dog concept, properties of the dog concept that 
are not, at a particular moment, evident in the new 
animal can nevertheless be generalized (i.e., mapped 
on) to the new animal, allowing us to make predictions 
about aspects of the new animal that we have not 
directly perceived (e.g., how a new instance of a dog 
will behave when someone scratches its ears). 
Thus, it is via abstraction that we can, as infants (or 
perhaps later in life), discover that there is a type of 
thing that is a dog or a lemon, and it is via 
generalization that we can apply this knowledge to new 
instances. Even as adults who possess more-or-less 
fully developed conceptual knowledge, abstraction and 
generalization continue to be necessary for learning 
about new things and for applying existing knowledge 
(imagine moving to the USA from Europe, where poison 
ivy doesn’t grow, and having to abstract, from 
examples, which plants to avoid because they are 
poison ivy, and then applying that knowledge on a 
hike). The example above is intended merely to give a 
flavor of how the abstraction process might work. In 
fact, there may not be a single “abstraction process”, 
rather there may be several distinct properties of the 
memory system which each contribute to the aspects of 
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memory we refer to as “abstract”1. In the final sections 
of this chapter, we describe a number of computational 
models of semantic memory that use computational 
mechanisms that can support abstraction, not all of 
which, in fact, require forming semantic representations 
per se. 
Now that we have considered what semantic 
memory is for, we turn to considering how it is 
structured and organized. 
3. What is the structure and 
organization of semantic memory? 
What is your semantic representation of a dog or a 
tree made up of, and how are these representations 
organized with respect to one another? In the semantic 
memory literature, researchers have attempted to 
answer these questions from both cognitive and 
cognitive neuroscientific perspectives. Cognitive 
approaches typically focus on how concepts may be 
internally structured, acquired, and organized with 
respect to one another. In contrast, cognitive 
neuroscientific approaches have focused primarily on 
how they are organized, using what is known about the 
structure and functional architecture of the human brain 
to constrain models. Although cognitive neuroscientific 
approaches often have little to say about how concepts 
are acquired and internally structured, the currently 
dominant class of cognitive neuroscientific models, 
sensorimotor-based models, are an important 
exception. We begin this section by briefly summarizing 
the most prominent cognitive models of how concepts 
are internally structured. We then turn to theories of the 
organization of semantic knowledge, with a focus on 
cognitive neuroscientific approaches. 
3.1 What is a concept made of? 
Historically, the three most prominent cognitively-
oriented theories of the internal structure of concepts 
have been classical definitional approaches, prototype 
theory, and exemplar theory. In what follows, we briefly 
introduce each. For a detailed consideration of these 
issues, refer to the chapter in this volume by Goldstone, 
Kersten, and Carvalho (2017). 
                                                
1 In this chapter we use the term abstraction in two related ways: 1) as 
explained above, to refer to the process of deriving information across 
instances that may not be available from any individual instance (in 
other work, this is sometimes called induction or generalization), and 
2) as discussed in subsequent sections, to refer to different levels of 
abstraction, i.e., differences in degree of detail or precision, where the 
less detail there is, the greater the level of abstraction, e.g., poodle vs. 
dog vs. animal. It is easy to imagine that the way that the abstraction 
process (in the first sense) is implemented produces different levels of 
abstraction (in the second sense). We reserve the term 
“generalization” for the related process of applying that abstracted 
knowledge to novel situations (cf. Altmann, 2017), that is, doing 
something with that knowledge. We consider these issues in further 
detail in Sections 6-8 (see also Barsalou, 2016, for further 
discussion). 
According to the classical theory of concepts, which 
dates back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, 
concepts can be thought of as definitions that are built 
from simpler concepts (e.g., bachelor = unmarried + 
man). Thus, deciding if someone is a bachelor is a 
matter of checking whether they are both unmarried 
and a man. The definitional approach has fallen out of 
favor, in part because for most concepts, agreeing on a 
precise definition is difficult or impossible (e.g., what 
defines a game? Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Prototype theory (Rosch, 1978) avoids the problem 
of deciding how to define concepts by positing that 
concepts are probabilistic, rather than having a 
definitional structure. That is, for each concept (e.g., 
dog), we encode a list of features (e.g., has four legs, 
has fur, barks) that are weighted by how frequently that 
feature has occurred in the dogs we have encountered. 
When we encounter a new dog, we attempt to match it 
to these weighted features, with the degree of match 
determining the likelihood that we will generalize, or 
correctly classify the new thing as a dog. Prototype 
theory has an interesting consequence. If what we think 
of as the most typical dog (e.g., size, shape, color, fur 
length, etc.) is a weighted average of all the dogs we 
have encountered, this average may be something we 
have never actually experienced (for review, see 
Murphy, 2002). Although in their most basic form, 
prototypes are unorganized lists of features (e.g., the 
features has wings and flies are not predictive of one 
another), there is evidence that we remember concepts 
better if the features “make sense” according to our 
prior knowledge (e.g., if the feature wings goes with 
files, rather than with swims; Murphy & Allopenna, 
1994). This suggests that we do attempt to organize 
features with respect to one another. In addition, a 
number of recent versions of prototype-style theories 
incorporate statistical aspects of featural 
representations, such as feature distinctiveness (Cree, 
McNorgan, & McRae, 2006; Randall, Moss, Rodd, 
Greer, & Tyler, 2004), and correlations among features 
(McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 
2001). 
But do we really need a stored list of weighted 
features to decide that a new thing is a member of a 
category? Exemplar models (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; 
Smith & Medin, 1981) posit that we do not. Instead, 
according to exemplar models, to decide if something 
that we encounter is, for example, a dog, we compare it 
to each of our previous experiences with dogs (all of 
which we have stored). The more similar it is to those 
dog exemplars, the more likely we are to decide that it 
is a dog. Like prototype theory, the exemplar model 
also predicts that classifying a never-before 
experienced thing as a dog may be easier than 
classifying an atypical dog that you have previously 
seen; something we have never seen can be more 
similar to our stored exemplars for a category than one 
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of those stored exemplars is to the rest (consider a 
novel spotted Labrador, compared to a Chihuahua)2. 
There is currently no clear consensus on whether 
exemplar or prototype models best fit human behavior. 
However, in an intriguing recent article, Murphy (2016) 
argued that there never has existed a coherent overall 
exemplar theory of concepts. Murphy’s arguments 
notwithstanding, if we consider that the summary 
descriptions described in the prototype model must 
originally develop from examples, it seems likely that 
remembered exemplars play an important role, 
especially in the development of conceptual knowledge. 
It may be the case, however, that as more and more 
examples continue to be encountered, we also store 
representations that reflect what is most common 
across all of those exemplars. That is, we may store 
abstractions. We consider abstraction further in 
subsequent sections (see also the chapter in this 
Handbook by Gureckis). 
3.2 How are concepts organized? 
We now turn to considering models of how 
conceptual knowledge is organized. We pay special 
attention to sensorimotor theories because of their 
influence on the field and because, as we will see, their 
architecture allows them to address not only the 
organization of conceptual knowledge, but also its 
acquisition and internal structure. 
Hierarchical models 
We learn in biology that organisms can be classified 
using a hierarchical system (e.g., a tree is a plant, and a 
plant is a living thing). Classical cognitive psychological 
theories describe the organization of knowledge in 
semantic memory in the same way—as a hierarchy that 
is structured according to the relations between 
concepts. There is some psychological evidence for 
hierarchical structure. For example, individuals are 
slower to identify that a tree is a living thing than that a 
plant is a living thing, a finding which has been 
interpreted as reflecting the greater distance to be 
travelled in the hierarchy to verify the statement (Collins 
& Quillian, 1969, but cf. Smith 1978). However, after 
controlling for potentially confounding factors that could 
have slowed verification responses for more distant 
properties, such as association between the terms, it 
                                                
2 Although categorization is performed differently in exemplar and 
prototype models, the process of conceptualization (e.g., imagining a 
typical dog when someone mentions dogs in general) results in the 
two sets of models making similar predictions. According to the 
exemplar model, each time we imagine a typical dog, we produce 
something similar to a weighted average of all of our dog exemplars, 
which would then provide another exemplar for our set of dogs 
(Hintzman, 1986). This exemplar would be experienced frequently 
(via all of the times we think about dogs when they are not there), 
resulting in a stored “best example” which would be similar to a 
prototype/stored summary description. It would be different from a 
prototype, however, in that this “best” exemplar would not have any 
special status. That is, like any other instance of experience, it would 
be a reflection of, rather than a description of, the category. 
has been difficult to obtain empirical evidence that 
people do routinely use hierarchies to store and retrieve 
conceptual knowledge (Murphy et al., 2012). For these 
and other reasons, strict hierarchical models of 
semantic organization are unlikely candidates at the 
moment. 
Neurally-inspired models 
In early work, Warrington & McCarthy (1983) 
described an individual who had more difficulty 
identifying non-living things than living things. Soon 
thereafter, Warrington and Shallice (1984) described 
several patients exhibiting the opposite pattern: more 
difficulty identifying living than nonliving things. These 
individuals with brain injuries inspired two influential 
neural models of the organization of semantic 
knowledge: 1) domain-specific category-based models; 
and 2) sensory-functional theory, as well as its 
successor, sensorimotor-based models. Below we 
describe each in turn. 
Domain-specific/category-based models 
Patterns of deficits like the ones described above 
suggest that brain damage can differentially affect 
categories (or domains) of objects, such as living 
versus nonliving things. One way to account for this 
pattern is to posit that different categories of objects are 
processed in distinct brain regions. The domain-specific 
category-based model (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) is 
based on this idea. In this model, due to evolutionary 
pressures, human brains developed dedicated fast and 
accurate neural mechanisms for recognizing a few 
categories that are particularly relevant for survival or 
reproduction (animals, plant life, conspecifics, and 
tools). Moreover, because efficiently recognizing each 
of these categories requires different mechanisms, the 
adaptations produced a neural organization in which the 
categories have distinct, non-overlapping 
representations. This is not to say, however, that these 
representations must be localized to circumscribed 
brain regions. A more recent extension of this model, 
the distributed domain-specific hypothesis, suggests 
that categories are distributed across the brain, albeit in 
distinct, non-overlapping neural regions (see Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2009, for a review). 
Sensory-functional theory 
Rather than interpreting their early observations of 
individuals with category-specific deficits as evidence 
that conceptual knowledge in the brain adheres to a 
category-based organization, Warrington and Shallice 
(1984) hypothesized that sensory and functional 
information contribute to create conceptual knowledge, 
and that different categories of knowledge tend to rely 
on these two types of information to different extents. 
For instance, according to sensory-functional theory, 
representations of living things tend to depend more on 
visual information than do artifacts, which depend more 
on information about their function. This means that 
even without semantic memory being categorically 
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organized per se, if access to one type of information is 
compromised, deficits could appear to be category-
specific (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1987). Although sensory-functional theory 
was highly influential, the existence of patients whose 
deficits are not consistent with a sensory-functional 
division indicates that semantic knowledge cannot be 
captured by a simple two-way divide (see Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2009, for a review). 
Sensorimotor-based models 
Sensorimotor-based models (also known as 
“grounded”, or “embodied” models) are an extension of 
sensory-functional theory. However, in these models, 
sensory information is divided into as many attributes 
as there are types of sensory input. According to Alan 
Allport, who revived such models in the late 20th 
century, the sensorimotor systems through which we 
experience the world are also used to represent 
meaning. “The essential idea is that the same neural 
elements that are involved in coding the sensory 
attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to 
eye or hand or ear also make up the elements of the 
auto-associated activity-patterns that represent familiar 
object-concepts in ‘semantic memory’” (Allport, 1985, p. 
53)3. In recent decades, several models have made 
similar claims from perspectives that are linguistically 
oriented (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), cognitively oriented 
(Barsalou, 1999) and cognitive neuroscientifically 
oriented (Damasio, 1989; Pulvermuller, 1999). These 
models are appealing because unlike many others, they 
make specific predictions about how semantic 
information is obtained in the first place (via sensory 
and motor experience), as well as how and where in the 
brain this information is processed (in the sensory and 
motor systems in which it was acquired). For a detailed 
discussion of this perspective, we refer the reader to the 
chapter in this volume by Matheson and Barsalou.  
A large body of research now supports 
sensorimotor-based models. Numerous functional 
neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and 
neuromodulatory (e.g., TMS: transcranial magnetic 
stimulation) studies converge to suggest that semantic 
knowledge for a given object concept is built around its 
sensory and motor attributes (e.g., its color, shape, 
smell, and how people use it). These attributes are 
distributed across brain regions that underlie sensory 
and motor processing (for reviews see Gainotti, 2000; 
Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2012; Noppeney, 2009; Yee et 
al., 2013). Consequently, at present, most semantic 
memory researchers would agree that conceptual 
representations are, at least in part, represented in 
sensorimotor systems. Active areas of research explore 
(1) How, and/or where, in the brain this sensorimotor-
based information may be combined (or bound) into a 
coherent concept from a jumble of features, and 
                                                
3 The ideas, however, go back at least 300 years to the British 
empiricist philosophers, John Locke and David Hume. 
perhaps relatedly, (2) How sensorimotor-based 
information might be integrated to produce a 
representation that involves the sensory and motor 
systems to differing degrees depending upon the 
situational demands. 
One method for binding features is believed to 
involve synchronous neural activity. That is, 
semantically coherent representations may be created 
by integrating patterns of synchronized neural activity 
representing different aspects of sensory and motor 
information (e.g., Singer & Gray, 1995; Schneider et al., 
2008). Another (compatible) possibility is that there are 
regions of cortex that function as hubs in that they 
receive and combine input from multiple modality-
specific areas. These hubs are hypothesized to not only 
bind together features, but to also transform their input 
such that they represent similarity among concepts that 
cannot be captured based on individual sensory or 
motor modalities (for review, see Patterson et al., 
2007). 
Although most hub models are silent regarding how 
they determine which inputs are integrated, an early 
sensorimotor-based model proposed solving this 
problem by integrating the concept of hubs (which, in 
this model, are referred to as convergence zones) with 
that of temporal synchrony (Damasio, 1989). According 
to the convergence zone framework, not only do 
convergence zones combine input from multiple areas, 
they also reflect synchronous activity within the areas 
from which they receive input. Moreover, the 
convergence zone framework posits that multiple levels 
of convergence zones (i.e., a hierarchical structure) are 
necessary to build up semantic representations (see 
Simmons & Barsalou, 2003, and McNorgan et al., 2011 
for evidence consistent with multiple levels of 
convergence zones from brain damaged and healthy 
participants, respectively). 
There currently is considerable evidence that there 
are brain regions (in particular, in the anterior temporal 
lobe and angular gyrus) that function as hubs or 
convergence zones (for reviews of neuropsychological 
and neuroimaging evidence for hubs, see Binder, 2016, 
and Patterson et al., 2007, respectively). Through 
integrating input from multiple areas, these regions may 
support abstraction and generalization. We return to the 
neural regions supporting these processes in Section 6. 
3.3 Summary of the structure and 
organization of semantic memory 
Where does this consideration of cognitive and 
neurally oriented models of semantic memory leave us? 
First, it is worth noting that it has been argued that the 
hub/convergence zone architecture described above 
could not only bind features into objects, but, in an 
analogous fashion, higher order convergence zones 
could bind objects into generalized events (e.g., making 
toast; Damasio, 1989). It also has been suggested that 
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mechanisms that receive and integrate input about 
sensory and motor features are likely to extract 
statistical regularities across these features that 
correlate with taxonomic categories. In other words, a 
hub/convergence zone architecture could allow a 
category-like topography to emerge from sensorimotor 
input without the need to posit pre-specified divisions 
among categories, or a strictly hierarchical taxonomic 
organization (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). 
Second, both of the cognitive models that we have 
considered, that is, prototype and exemplar models, 
are, in principle, compatible with the two current models 
of the organization of semantic memory (domain-
specific and sensorimotor models). Although domain-
specific category-based models are committed to the 
existence of neural regions dedicated to a few, 
evolutionarily relevant categories, these models are 
silent about how, within these categories, knowledge is 
represented, as well as about how all other categories 
of knowledge might be represented. Likewise, although 
sensorimotor-based models posit that concepts are 
acquired via sensory and motor experience, and are at 
least partially represented in sensory and motor 
cortices, they are also silent about whether the 
categories that we form are based on a single, 
probabilistic representation (i.e., a prototype) or stored 
exemplars. 
Although our current understanding of categorization 
behavior and the organization of the neural systems 
supporting semantic memory does not allow 
determining whether prototype or exemplar models are 
more plausible, it seems likely that examples play an 
important role in the development of conceptual 
knowledge. In the next section, we discuss evidence for 
the importance of such examples. We also consider 
evidence that as development proceeds, conceptual 
knowledge may gain the flexibility to rely more or less 
heavily on the sensorimotor systems (see Gureckis, 
2017). 
4. How is semantic memory 
acquired? 
Clearly, to know things about the world, such as 
what strawberries look and smell like, that bicycles have 
two wheels, or that elephants have DNA, we must have 
learned that information during some episode(s). These 
experiences may be direct, such as actually 
encountering strawberries, or through language, such 
as learning about a type of fruit that we have never 
seen. However, does this mean that all information in 
semantic memory begins as information in episodic 
memory (i.e., as information that is linked to a specific 
time and place)? Or can information be incorporated 
into our semantic memory even if we were never able to 
explicitly recall the episode(s) in which we were 
exposed to it? Opinions on these questions differ. Some 
authors have argued that episodic memory is the 
“gateway” to semantic memory—that is, that semantic 
memory must be acquired via episodic memory (see 
Squire & Zola, 1998 for review), although eventually, 
semantic information may exist independently. In 
contrast, Tulving (1991) argues that, “new information 
could be stored in semantic memory in the absence of a 
functioning episodic system, as presumably happens in 
very young children and in lower animals without 
episodic memory” (p. 20). 
Evidence from individuals with severe episodic 
memory deficits can help address the question of 
whether a functioning episodic memory system is 
necessary to acquire new semantic knowledge. For 
instance, research with the famous amnesic patient 
H.M. revealed that after the surgery that led to his 
amnesia, he acquired some new semantic knowledge 
(e.g., for words that came into common use after his 
surgery; Gabrieli et al., 1988; cf. O’Kane et al., 2004). 
Two other individuals who became amnesic as adults 
have also exhibited some, albeit extremely limited, new 
semantic knowledge after the illnesses that led to their 
amnesia (Bayley & Squire, 2005; Bayley et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, individuals who have had amnesia since 
early childhood appear to have relatively intact 
semantic knowledge, despite the fact that they had little 
time to acquire semantic knowledge when their episodic 
system was intact (Bindschaedler et al., 2011; Gardiner 
et al., 2008; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Although 
such evidence seems to suggest that semantic 
knowledge can be acquired without an intact episodic 
memory system, it is worth noting that semantic 
knowledge acquisition in these amnesic patients is not 
normal (e.g., it is acquired very slowly and laboriously). 
It is therefore possible that these patients may possess 
sufficient remaining episodic memory to allow for the 
acquisition of semantic knowledge (Squire & Zola, 
1998). Another (compatible) possibility is that the 
acquisition of semantic memory normally makes use of 
the episodic system, but that other (less efficient) points 
of entry can be more heavily relied upon when the 
episodic system is damaged (or has not yet developed 
fully). 
What might be some of these “points of entry”? As 
one might imagine given the prominence of 
sensorimotor-based models, sensory and motor 
information that may be acquired implicitly is an obvious 
candidate. And in fact, there is clear evidence from 
studies on the development of conceptual knowledge in 
young children that sensory and motor information are 
important for developing semantic knowledge about 
object concepts. Some of this evidence comes from 
studies examining how young children categorize and 
make inferences about novel objects. For example, 
when two-year old children were presented with a novel 
object and instructed to move it horizontally, they were 
more likely to consider it to be similar to (i.e., to 
categorize it with) another novel object whose long axis 
extended horizontally than one whose long axis 
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extended vertically, whereas the preference reversed 
for children who moved the original novel object 
vertically (Smith, 2005). Thus, motor information has an 
implicit influence on their categorization, which 
presumably affects their conceptual representations. 
Like 2-year olds, at ages 4-5, young children also 
show a tendency to prioritize sensory/perceptual 
information when categorizing objects, as indicated by 
their inferences about the objects. After learning to label 
novel creatures as either “ziblets” or “flurps” based on a 
rule that did not correlate with overall perceptual 
appearance (e.g., ziblets have more fingers than 
buttons, but are not otherwise perceptually similar to 
one another), children were shown a new target 
creature, told that it had a hidden property (in this case, 
thick blood) and asked which of two other new 
creatures also had thick blood. Children consistently 
selected the creature that had more overall perceptual 
similarity to the target creature, rather than the creature 
that, based on the fingers-to-buttons-ratio rule, had the 
same label (Sloutsky et al., 2007). Thus, at 4-5 years of 
age, perceptual information that is derived implicitly 
appears to play an important role in developing 
semantic knowledge about object concepts, and 
perhaps a larger role than the explicitly learned label. 
Such demonstrations with young children suggest that 
statistical regularities in their sensory and motor input 
may allow them to form new object concepts, without 
the need to depend on explicitly learned information. 
There is little controversy about the claim that for 
infants, sensorimotor information is essential to the 
acquisition of semantic knowledge about object 
concepts4. However, a central question about semantic 
memory is whether there is a developmental shift with 
respect to the role of sensorimotor information in object 
knowledge. Common sense suggests that there should 
be. Adults have many ways to develop semantic 
representations for new object concepts (e.g., through 
verbally described definitions, “jicama is a root 
vegetable”, or through analogy, “jicama has a texture 
similar to an apple, but it tastes kind of like a potato”). 
Infants, however, must rely entirely on the sensory and 
                                                
4 Debate continues, however, between nativist and empiricist 
accounts of conceptual development. In nativist accounts, infants’ 
interpretation of the sensorimotor input is constrained by innate 
biases or “theories”, for example, that there are core domains of 
knowledge like objects, animates, and number (Carey, 2009; Spelke 
et al., 1992). Empiricist accounts claim that there is sufficient structure 
in the input that concepts can be learned from perceptual experience 
with the aid of innate general-purpose cognitive biases. That is, there 
is no need for innate biases that pertain specifically to conceptual 
knowledge (for review, see Sloutsky 2010; Rakison & Lawson, 2013). 
Both views agree that for older children and adults, hearing common 
labels for objects promotes categorizing those objects as instances of 
the same concept. According to the nativist view, humans have an 
innate predisposition to assume that words refer to concepts 
(Markman, 1990), whereas according to the empiricist view, words 
initially have no more weight than other sensory or motor information, 
but that over development, words gain a more prominent role in 
categorization as children learn that labels are predictive of category 
membership (Sloutsky et al., 2001; Deng & Sloutsky, 2012). 
motor information that is available to them when they 
experience the object (e.g., their own experience of the 
jicama’s taste, smell, texture, and feel). 
Empirical evidence is also consistent with a shift. 
Although young children rely more on perceptual 
similarity than on labels when making inferences (or 
predictions) about unseen object properties (e.g., 
Sloutsky et al., 2007, described above; for a review, see 
Rakison & Lawson, 2013), older children and adults are 
more strongly influenced by category labels and by 
higher order regularities -- that is, by regularities that 
may be detectable across instances of experiencing an 
object concept. For example, older children and adults 
are more inclined than younger children to group a car 
together with a bicycle, presumably in part because of 
the knowledge that both are used for transport. To 
explain this shift, Sloutsky (2010) proposed that a 
“selection-based system may subserve [certain types 
of] category learning by shifting attention to category-
relevant dimension(s) and away from irrelevant 
dimension(s). Such selectivity may require the 
involvement of brain structures associated with 
executive function...[and] there is evidence that many 
components of executive function critical for learning 
sparse categories exhibit late developmental onset ...” 
(p. 1249; cf. Rogers & McClelland, 2004 for a 
connectionist account of developmental changes in 
conceptual organization).  
Hence, the evidence supports the (common sense) 
idea that as children develop, their semantic 
representations increasingly rely on abstracted 
information, that is, information that is grounded less in 
direct sensorimotor experience and that depends more 
on higher order statistical regularities and category 
labels. We return to the process of abstraction in 
Sections 6 and 7. However, first we consider whether 
semantic knowledge is ever “fully developed”. That is, 
we consider whether changes to, or long-term 
differences in, experience can result in discernable 
differences in semantic knowledge across adults. 
5. Individual differences in semantic 
memory 
Given the fact that semantic memory is often 
referred to as “general world knowledge”, it seems 
obvious that individual differences in semantic memory 
should exist. After all, depending on your experiences, 
you may or may not know the capital of Vermont or 
what an ocelot looks like. It follows that cultural factors 
can be important sources of differences in conceptual 
processing (see the chapter in this volume by Yap, Ji, & 
Hong). Perhaps more surprisingly, there are also subtle 
differences in what different individuals know (or 
believe) about more common things, such as a trumpet, 
hammer, or bird, as well as differences in how we 
categorize them or view their similarity to one another. 
Moreover, if sensorimotor-based models are correct in 
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positing that experience determines conceptual 
representations, then to the extent that experiences 
differ, representations must differ as well. In this 
section, we consider individual differences in semantic 
knowledge. 
5.1 Differences in categorization 
On the surface, categories may appear to be fixed. 
Once you learn what hammers or birds are, intuition 
suggests that these are stable categories that neither 
vary across time within an individual, nor across 
individuals. However, behavioral evidence suggests 
that even the broad categories that we use to organize 
the world differ across individuals, as well as within an 
individual (across the lifespan). When asked to indicate 
which is more closely related, a robin and a nest, or a 
robin and a duck, East Asians are more likely to select 
the robin and nest than are Westerners (Ji et al., 2004). 
This selection reflects sensitivity to thematic, or event-
based, relations. Thematic, in contrast with taxonomic, 
knowledge concerns what or how things typically “go 
together”, or play complementary roles in the same 
action or event. Individual differences can also be found 
within a culture. Among Western participants, some 
adults exhibit a consistent preference to categorize 
thematically, while others prefer to classify 
taxonomically (e.g., categorizing robin with duck; Lin & 
Murphy, 2001), and these preferences remain 
consistent across implicit and explicit measures 
(Mirman & Graziano, 2012). Moreover, at as young as 
age three, children show stable preferences for either 
thematic or taxonomic categorization, and these 
preferences can be predicted by aspects of their play 
and language behavior at 13 months and at 24 months, 
respectively (Dunham & Dunham, 1995)5. Interestingly, 
these preferences may change over development—
there appears to be a shift during young childhood 
whereby younger children strongly prefer to categorize 
thematically, but this bias weakens as children get older 
(for review, see Markman, 1990). Although the reason 
for this shift is unknown, it has been suggested that it 
may be related to developing language abilities (e.g., 
knowing that robins and ducks are both called birds 
might encourage infants to search for commonalities 
between robins and ducks; Waxman & Markow, 1995). 
In addition to individual, cultural, and developmental 
differences in the broad categories that we use to 
organize the world, there are also more subtle 
differences across individuals in how semantic 
knowledge is organized and represented. We next turn 
to some examples of such differences, starting with how 
                                                
5 Specifically, children who at age 3 prefer to categorize taxonomically 
exhibited more pointing behavior and labeling of individual objects at 
13 and 24 months, respectively. In contrast, children who prefer to 
categorize thematically at age 3 exhibited more relational play and 
use of relational terms at 13 and 24 months (Dunham & Dunham, 
1995). 
expertise with actions or objects influences an 
individual’s semantic knowledge. 
5.2 Expertise-induced differences 
Differences in expertise can produce behaviorally 
and neurally measureable differences in conceptual 
activation. For instance, professional musicians can 
identify pictures of musical instruments more quickly 
and accurately than can novices (non-musicians), while 
no such difference is found for common objects. 
Moreover, this pattern is reflected neurally. For 
professional musicians, pictures of musical instruments 
activate auditory association cortex and adjacent areas 
more so than do pictures of common objects, with no 
such difference being found for novices (Hoenig et al., 
2011). 
Analogous findings have been reported for ice 
hockey experts. Simply listening to sentences 
describing hockey actions (but not everyday actions) 
activates premotor regions more in hockey experts than 
in novices (Beilock, Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum 
& Small, 2008). Thus, the brain regions that are 
differentially activated for experts (in these two studies, 
auditory for musicians, and premotor for hockey 
experts) appear to be due to their specific types of 
experience. Moreover, the fact that these regions are 
active when the experts perform tasks that do not 
require accessing musical or action knowledge 
suggests that these aspects of experience have 
become part of their semantic representations of 
instruments and actions, respectively. 
Within non-experts, there is also evidence of 
experience-based differences in conceptual knowledge. 
Yee, Chrysikou, Hoffman, and Thompson-Schill (2013) 
found that performing a sequence of hand motions that 
are incompatible with those used to interact with 
frequently manipulated objects such as pencils disrupts 
thinking about such objects more than it disrupts 
thinking about less frequently manipulated objects, such 
as tigers. Critically for the current point, participants’ 
ratings of their degree of manual experience with an 
object predicted the degree of interference that the 
manual task produced. Moreover, for non-experts, like 
for the experts described above, experience with an 
object affects its neural representation. When listening 
to an object’s name, activation in a brain region 
involved in performing object-related actions (left 
parietal cortex) correlates with participants’ ratings of 
their amount of lifetime tactile experience with an object 
(Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski & Thompson-Schill, 
2009). 
Even just a few weeks of sensory or motor 
experience can produce differences in neural activity 
during conceptual activation. For instance, Kiefer, Sim, 
Liebich, Hauk, and Tanaka (2007) trained participants 
to classify novel objects while either pointing at them or 
pantomiming actions toward them. After three weeks, 
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when participants simply made judgments on the 
objects’ written names, EEG source analysis revealed 
that participants who had been trained to pantomime at 
the objects, but not those who had been trained to point 
at them, showed early activity in motor regions and later 
activity in occipito-parietal visual-motor regions. 
Analogous findings have been reported for novel 
objects for which olfactory experience was either 
present or absent (Ghio et al., 2016). These and related 
findings (Cross et al., 2012; Oliver, Parsons, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2008; Ruther et al., 2014a; Weisberg, 
Turennout, & Martin, 2007), suggest that years of 
experience are not required to impact the neural 
representations of concepts—shorter-term differences 
in sensorimotor experience can have a measurable 
impact as well. 
5.3 Bodily-induced differences 
Differences in sensory or motor experience can be 
larger and more pervasive than those described above. 
And as might be expected (given what has been 
observed for differences in expertise and in relatively 
short-term experience), larger, bodily-induced 
differences in experience, such as the absence of input 
in a sensory modality, can also affect semantic 
representation. For example, for sighted, but not for 
blind individuals, implicit similarity judgments about 
fruits and vegetables are influenced by color similarity 
(Connolly et al., 2007). Importantly, this is true even for 
blind participants who have good explicit color 
knowledge6. 
However, the dramatic differences in sensory 
experience between early blind and sighted individuals 
do not always produce detectable differences in 
behavioral measures of semantic knowledge, or in its 
neural organization. For instance, when making 
judgments that in sighted individuals are thought to rely, 
in part, on processing visual motion (e.g., is chiseling a 
hand action with a tool?), both blind and sighted 
participants selectively activate a brain region that in 
sighted individuals receives input from an area 
associated with processing visual motion (left posterior 
middle temporal gyrus, which receives input from area 
V5/MT; Noppeney et al., 2003). Moreover, blind and 
sighted participants show category-specific (e.g., 
animals vs. artifacts) activation in ventral stream brain 
regions that, in sighted participants, are associated with 
visual processing (ventral temporal and ventral occipital 
regions; Mahon et al., 2009). Such findings may appear 
to be incompatible with sensorimotor-based theories, 
which posit that differences in visual experience explain 
                                                
6 Interestingly, blind and sighted individuals did not differ in their 
judgments about household items—a distinction that is consistent with 
evidence suggesting that color’s importance in an object’s 
representation depends upon how useful it is for recognizing the 
object (e.g., color is important for distinguishing lemons from limes, 
but not for distinguishing toasters from microwave ovens; see Tanaka 
& Presnell, 1999, for review). 
why ventral “visual” brain regions respond differently to 
different categories of stimuli (e.g., between animals 
and tools). However, given that it is well-established 
that neural plasticity results in reorganization of the 
cortex if visual input is absent (for a review, see Amedi, 
Merabet, Bermpohl & Pascual-Leone, 2005), it may be 
that in blind individuals these ventral regions are 
sensitive to non-visual factors that correlate with hand 
action and with the living/non-living distinction (e.g., 
shape information that is acquired tactilely). Thus, the 
knowledge represented in these regions may still be 
based on experience, but not on visual experience. 
A similar argument can help reconcile a 
sensorimotor-based account with another result that 
may seem to challenge it. It has been proposed that 
understanding an observed action (e.g., shooting a 
basketball) is based, at least in part, on the observer’s 
ability to perform a “motor simulation” of the observed 
action (e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 2001). However, there is 
evidence that the absence of motor experience does 
not necessarily impair knowledge of actions. When 
presented with videos of actions, individuals born 
without/with severely shortened upper limbs can 
recognize, remember, and anticipate actions as 
accurately as typically developed participants 
(Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016). This finding 
indicates that knowledge about actions is not 
necessarily based on the ability to perform those 
actions (even though such knowledge might ordinarily 
be represented in that way). Nevertheless, it is perfectly 
compatible with the idea that action knowledge (and 
indeed, conceptual knowledge more generally) is 
experience-based. That is, for individuals with 
experience performing actions, action knowledge will be 
supported by that experience, but for individuals without 
experience performing actions, action knowledge will be 
supported by whatever experience they do have of 
actions, which would include experience visually 
perceiving them. 
Importantly, it appears that the absence of a specific 
type of sensory or motoric information does not 
necessarily produce impoverished representations (or if 
it does, differences are subtle and difficult to detect). 
Instead, we suggest that there may be a sort of 
conceptual compensation (or adaptation) whereby the 
information that is available becomes particularly 
important and informative for representations, at least 
when the system has had time to adapt or has never 
developed reliance on a specific modality. Thus, just as 
experts appear to have different conceptual 
representations in their areas of expertise compared to 
novices, individuals with different bodies should also 
have different (and not necessarily more or less 
informative) representations. One example of how 
representations can differ based on long-term bodily 
experience comes from a highly pervasive individual 
difference—which hand is typically used to interact with 
an object. Kan and her colleagues have reported that 
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pictures of tools (but not pictures of non-manipulable 
things like animals) activate left premotor cortex more in 
right-handers than in left-handers (Kan, Kable, Van 
Scoyoc, Chatterjee & Thompson-Schill, 2006; see 
Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto, 2010, for related 
findings).7 
Together, the studies described in this section 
indicate that the organization of semantic knowledge, 
and its neural representation, can be affected by both 
large and small individual differences in sensory or 
motor abilities. More importantly, they show that with 
differences in long-term experience, representations 
can develop differently or adapt, such that semantic 
knowledge that grows out of nonidentical sets of 
processes can nevertheless be equally informative. 
5.4 Summary of individual differences in 
semantic memory 
A fundamental prediction of sensorimotor-based 
theories is that object concepts include knowledge that 
is represented in, or processed by, the sensorimotor 
regions that are routinely active when that object is 
perceived or interacted with. This means that 
individuals with different experiences should have 
different representations and that even within an 
individual, as experience changes, that individual’s 
representations should change as well. Such individual 
differences may seem problematic because it would 
mean that no two individuals’ concepts of, for example, 
lemon will be exactly the same, and perhaps more 
disconcertingly, that your own concept of lemon 
changes, albeit probably subtly, over time. However, 
the data described above suggest that this is, in fact, 
what happens. 
Much of the research described in Section 5 shows 
how individual differences in conceptual knowledge 
manifest as differences in the manner in which different 
brain regions are recruited, whether through differences 
in expertise, or through differences in sensory or motor 
experience. In the next section, we review more broadly 
the role of different brain regions in conceptual 
representation. 
6. Which brain regions support 
semantic memory, and how? 
We suggested in Section 3 that there is ample 
evidence from the neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological literatures to support sensorimotor-
based models of semantic memory, which claim that 
the brain regions involved in perception and action also 
                                                
7 Perhaps surprisingly, abstract concepts’ representations may also 
be influenced by differences in individual experience. Right-handers’ 
have a tendency to associate “good” with “right” and “bad” with “left”; 
whereas left handers show the opposite pattern (Casasanto, 2009). 
Intriguingly, this pattern can be reversed when right hand dominance 
is compromised due to stroke, or even a brief (12 minute) laboratory-
induced handicap (Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011). 
support meaning. Several of the studies in the previous 
section provide converging evidence by showing that 
the sensory and motor areas supporting semantic 
knowledge appear to change as sensory and motor 
experience changes. However, there is also general 
agreement that the neural representation of semantic 
knowledge extends beyond activation in modality-
specific regions. In a comprehensive meta-analytic 
review of functional neuroimaging studies, Binder et al. 
(2009) identified several non modality-specific regions 
that consistently have been implicated in tasks requiring 
semantic knowledge. These include the inferior parietal 
lobe (including the angular gyrus), large portions of the 
lateral and ventral temporal lobes, and several parts of 
the frontal lobe including the inferior frontal gyrus. 
A complete discussion of these brain regions is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (see the chapter by 
Matheson & Barsalou for an in-depth discussion). 
Instead, we limit our discussion to the inferior frontal 
gyrus, the angular gyrus, and the anterior temporal lobe 
because these regions have often been characterized 
as “general” semantic areas. That is, they are 
discussed as being heteromodal in supporting multiple 
modalities of input (e.g., visual and auditory) and 
multiple categories of semantic knowledge (e.g., 
animals and artifacts). Evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience suggests that each of these brain regions 
may support semantic knowledge in different ways. 
The inferior frontal gyrus, for instance, appears to 
support semantic processing by virtue of promoting the 
selection of contextually appropriate information 
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). Notably, however, the 
inferior frontal gyrus is thought to support general-
purpose selection, meaning that although this region 
frequently acts in the service of semantic processing, it 
also supports selection in non-semantic tasks (for 
review, see Thompson-Schill, 2003). 
The angular gyrus has often been put forth as an 
important heteromodal association area by virtue of its 
location between visual, auditory, spatial and 
somatosensory association areas (for discussion, see 
Binder, 2009). There is some evidence that this region 
has a particularly important role in supporting the type 
of thematic or event-based semantic knowledge that 
was introduced in Section 5.1 (e.g., that dog is related 
to leash; Humpheries et al., 2007; Kalenine et al., 2009; 
Mirman & Granzino, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2011; de 
Zubicaray et al., 2013). However, because some 
studies have not linked thematic knowledge in particular 
to the angular gyrus (see Jackson et al., 2015), more 
research is needed to understand the specific 
conditions under which this region may support 
thematic knowledge or processing (Kalenine & 
Buxbaum, 2016). 
The anterior temporal lobe (ATL) has received 
perhaps the most attention in the literature on the 
neural representation of semantic knowledge. One 
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reason for this is the existence of a neurological 
condition called semantic dementia, which, early in the 
progression of the disease, often is characterized by 
relatively focal degeneration in the ATL. Individuals with 
semantic dementia have semantic memory deficits such 
as problems with naming, recognizing, and classifying 
objects, regardless of the category of knowledge. In 
contrast, other cognitive functions are relatively spared. 
Thus, the ATL appears to support general semantic 
knowledge (see Hodges & Patterson, 2007, for a 
review).  
Functional neuroimaging studies of unimpaired 
individuals also implicate the ATL in general semantic 
processing. For instance, Tyler et al. (2004) had people 
name pictures using either basic level labels such as 
dog or hammer or superordinate level labels such as 
animal or tool. They found that the ATL (specifically, the 
perirhinal cortex, and primarily in the left hemisphere) 
was more active when people named pictures using 
basic level labels, as compared to superordinate level 
labels. In contrast, a region of the posterior temporal 
lobe (fusiform gyrus, bilaterally) was activated equally 
during naming at the two levels. These results are 
consistent with the idea that the ATL supports object 
categorization, and that the amount of ATL involvement 
is a function of how much detail is needed to perform 
the targeted level of categorization (see Rogers et al., 
2006 and Rogers & Patterson 2007 for related findings 
and discussion).8  
How might the ATL support semantic processing? 
Recordings of neural activity (via 
magnetoencephalography) show that during basic level 
naming of visually presented objects, there are more 
recurrent interactions between anterior and posterior 
(fusiform) regions of the left temporal lobe than during 
superordinate level naming (Clark et al., 2011). Given 
the posterior fusiform’s involvement in processing visual 
features of objects, it is possible that the ATL functions 
as the “hub” of a network that facilitates the integration 
of information across features, and that such integration 
is necessary for categorization tasks such as 
determining that an image depicts a dog rather than a 
cat (see Martin & Chao, 2001). Furthermore, the ATL’s 
involvement increases as a function of discrimination 
demands (Clark et al., 2011). Or, to use the vocabulary 
we used in Section 2, the ATL may support 
generalization by supporting the process of applying our 
existing semantic knowledge to the input, in this case to 
categorize it. 
Thus, the ATL’s greater involvement in basic relative 
to superordinate level categorization (Tyler et al., 2004; 
Rogers et al., 2006) may not be due to containing the 
                                                
8 Recent work also considers whether different sub regions of the 
ATL, or the left versus right ATLs, may support different aspects of 
semantic knowledge (e.g., social knowledge, verbally-mediated 
semantic knowledge, non-verbal semantic knowledge; for reviews, 
see Gainotti, 2015; Lambon-Ralph et al., 2017). 
perceptual information required for finer-grained 
discrimination. Rather, the integration that occurs in this 
region may produce a similarity space that is organized 
in a way that reflects relationships among multiple 
features. In this space, higher-order relationships may 
play a more important role than perceptual information 
(see Rogers et al., 2004). Thus, when the goal is to 
match (i.e., categorize) a perceptually presented item 
with a region of this similarity space, the task is more 
difficult when attempting to match the input with 
narrower categories (e.g., dogs) than with broader 
categories (e.g., living things) because narrower 
categories require accessing more of that item’s 
perceptual representation in posterior regions9. 
More broadly, there is evidence to suggest that 
integration and abstraction may occur throughout the 
ventral temporal lobe (e.g., the ventral visual pathway; 
Tanaka 1996), producing a posterior to anterior gradient 
of abstraction. Specifically, more posterior regions 
reflect information that is based more closely on 
perceptual features, whereas more anterior regions 
reflect information that, due to integration across 
features, is somewhat more complex. In particular, 
anterior regions may reflect higher-order abstract 
relationships among features. Findings from several 
studies support this type of gradient (Chan et al., 2011; 
Grabowski et al., 2001; Kable et al., 2005; Hsu et al., 
2011), and many others are consistent more generally 
with the idea that semantic knowledge is represented at 
different levels of abstraction (or is integrated to 
different degrees) in different regions (Fernandino et al., 
2015). 
Having different levels of abstraction may help 
alleviate a potential concern regarding sensorimotor-
based accounts of conceptual knowledge. If concepts 
are sensorimotor-based, one might worry that thinking 
of the concept of lemon could cause one to hallucinate 
a lemon, which people generally do not. Furthermore, 
thinking of the concept of kicking could elicit a kick, 
which could be embarrassing or perhaps even 
dangerous. Yet if concepts are indeed also represented 
at a more abstract level than that underlying direct 
                                                
9 This characterization, of basic level categorization requiring more 
processing than superordinate level categorization, may seem at odds 
with the well-established phenomena of basic level naming typically 
being privileged relative to superordinate level naming (e.g., basic 
level names are learned earlier during development, and, under 
unspeeded conditions, objects are named faster at the basic, relative 
to the superordinate level; Rosch, 1976). However, the basic level 
advantage in naming is likely due to the fact that it is more common to 
name objects at the basic than at the superordinate level (leading to 
stronger object-label associations at the basic level), not that 
recognizing objects at the superordinate level requires more 
processing. Recent behavioral evidence supports the idea that 
superordinate level recognition does not require additional 
processing. Under speeded conditions, categorization at the 
superordinate level is privileged relative to categorization at the basic 
level (Rogers & Patterson, 2007; Mack & Palmeri, 2015), and 
information needed to categorize at the superordinate level is 
available earlier than information needed to categorize at the basic 
level (for review, see Clarke, 2015). 
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sensation and action, then when thinking about, for 
example, kicking, the regions that underlie the motor act 
of kicking do not need to be sufficiently active to 
produce a kick. 
In the next section, we change gears somewhat to 
review computational models of conceptual 
representation that are not based on sensorimotor 
information. Although much of semantic knowledge 
comes from direct experience with objects and actions, 
a great deal of it does not. People learn a huge amount 
from spoken and written language. We have knowledge 
of places that we have never been, and of people that 
we have never met. The computational models 
described in Section 7 derive semantic knowledge from 
language input only. Despite being based solely on 
“abstract” input (language), they successfully capture 
many aspects of human semantic memory. In a sense, 
the success of such models can be considered a 
testament to the power of abstraction. 
7. Computational Models of Semantic 
Representation 
So far, we have focused on cognitive and 
neuroscientific models of semantic memory. The former 
are driven by functional considerations, such as the 
functions that memory serves, and the functional 
architecture of distinct memory systems. The latter are 
driven by how functions relevant to memory appear to 
be organized across different regions of the brain. In 
this section, we focus on computational models of 
semantic representation. Such models have the 
potential to explain how the nature of the input, or the 
algorithms operating over that input, constrain the 
organization of semantic memory, and how the learning 
process impacts that organization. However, the utility 
of computational models in understanding semantic 
memory from a psychological perspective depends on 
the extent to which the principles governing their 
operation may be assumed to correspond to 
psychologically relevant constructs, rather than 
reflecting implementational choices designed to 
increase their ability to predict behavior irrespective of 
psychological plausibility. In what follows, we try to 
highlight the psychologically relevant constructs. 
Recent work has obtained a proxy of mental 
semantic similarity by employing statistical processes 
that operate across either large databases of human-
generated features (McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & 
McNorgan, 2005; Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008), or across 
behavioral measures such as free association (Abbott, 
Austerweil, & Griffiths, 2015). Although these 
approaches have both had considerable success 
predicting human performance, they are limited in that 
neither one addresses how representations may be 
created in the first place (Jones, Hills, & Todd, 2015). 
Many current computational models of semantic 
representation do address how semantic 
representations may develop in the first place. These 
distributional semantic models use statistical 
experience (i.e., regularities in the environment) to 
construct semantic representations. Although for 
practical purposes, “experience” in these models is 
usually restricted to a large corpus of text, the models 
are in principle statistical learners that can be applied to 
any data that can be represented to them. In the 
discussion that follows, we use the terms ‘word’ and 
‘linguistic context’ because this is typically the input to 
the models, but in principle, these could be replace with 
‘object’ or ‘event’, and physical or temporal context. 
While there are now many distributional semantic 
models in the literature, they are all based on the 
distributional hypothesis, which is that words that 
appear in similar linguistic contexts are likely to have 
related meanings (Firth, 1957; Harris, 1970). For 
example, car may frequently co-occur with wheel, 
driver, and road. As a result, the model can infer that 
these words are related in some way. In addition, the 
model can learn that car is similar to truck even if the 
two never directly co-occur. This happens because car 
and truck both occur near the same types of words. 
Similarly, because car and net rarely appear in the 
same or similar contexts, according to the distributional 
hypothesis, they are not likely to be related. 
Due in part to the models’ successes at explaining 
human data, as well as the greater availability of text 
corpora, the field of distributional semantic models has 
grown enormously over the past two decades. There 
are now dozens of models in the literature, each with its 
own strengths and weaknesses. Rather than focusing 
on the technical differences among the various models, 
we instead focus on the psychological mechanisms that 
are used to build semantic representations. This allows 
us to organize distributional semantic models into five 
families: 1) Passive Co-occurrence, 2) Latent 
Abstraction, 3) Predictive, 4) Bayesian, and 5) 
Retrieval-Based. For technical differences among the 
models, we refer the reader to Riordan and Jones 
(2011) or Turney and Pantel (2010). 
While all distributional semantic models are based 
on the distributional hypothesis, the families of models 
differ in theoretically important ways in terms of the 
mechanisms they posit for how distributional 
information is learned, and the type of information that 
is stored in the semantic representation. They thus 
differ with respect to how they model abstraction. These 
mechanisms range from simple Hebbian learning to 
Bayesian inference and reinforcement learning. In 
addition to differences in learning mechanisms, these 
families also differ in when they hypothesize that 
semantic abstraction takes place from episodic 
experience. Some models suffer from psychological 
implausibility in that they abstract meaning via a 
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learning mechanism that is applied only after all 
episodes have been learned, whereas others 
accumulate semantic information continuously as 
experience unfolds. In contrast, there are other models, 
like the exemplar models described earlier, that posit 
that only episodic traces are stored, and semantic 
abstraction is an artifact of retrieval from episodic 
memory. A challenge for such models is to account for 
evidence suggesting that episodic memories for one’s 
entire life can be lost without losing access to semantic 
knowledge (see Tulving, 2002 for review). One 
possibility is that in such cases, the ability to explicitly 
retrieve episodic memories is lost, but the episodic 
traces themselves remain in some form. If true, these 
traces could allow for a type of implicit retrieval that 
supports semantic abstraction. For an in-depth review 
of the theoretical claims of different models, see Jones, 
Willits, and Dennis (2015). Below, we highlight only the 
main properties of the five families of models. 
7.1. Passive Co-occurrence Models 
Members of the family of passive co-occurrence 
models all share the characteristic that they simply 
count the co-occurrence frequency among words within 
an “attentional context”. The size of the attentional 
context is usually based loosely on working memory 
capacity, such that co-occurrences might be counted 
within, for example, a several-word moving window or a 
sentence, but rarely a full paragraph. In this sense, this 
family theoretically implements ideas of Hebbian 
learning from repeated stimulus pairings. Hence, 
models of this type are unsupervised learning models. 
Theoretically, they posit that sophisticated semantic 
representations are the product of a relatively simple 
associative count mechanism operating on statistical 
regularities in the linguistic environment. These models 
are therefore quite direct instantiations of Firth’s (1957) 
famous claim that “you shall know a word by the 
company it keeps”. 
One major benefit to these models is that they are 
incremental learners. In other words, they develop their 
semantic representations continuously as experience 
unfolds. This allows them to make predictions about 
how representations change and “develop” as a 
function of the statistics that the model experiences. To 
relate passive co-occurrence models to the cognitively-
oriented theories introduced in Section 3, passive co-
occurrence models could be construed as modern 
instantiations of prototype models because statistical 
tendencies are, in effect, prototypes. 
Perhaps the earliest passive co-occurrence model 
was the Hyperspace Analog to Language (HAL; Lund & 
Burgess, 1996). HAL simply slides a fixed width window 
(typically 5 to 10 words) across a text corpus, counting 
distance-weighted co-occurrences between words and 
storing these in a “long-term memory” matrix. Each 
word’s semantic representation in the matrix is a 
function of the distance between it and every other word 
within the window across learning. In effect, HAL 
produces a similarity space, with words that are similar 
distances from the same other words being in the same 
region of space (i.e., having similar meanings). 
Considering HAL’s simplicity, it has been able to explain 
a large amount of human data, ranging from semantic 
priming to categorization (Burgess & Lund, 2000). A 
model similar to HAL was used to predict human fMRI 
brain activations when thinking about features of 
concepts given the concept’s name and a picture 
(Mitchell et al., 2008). The original model has spawned 
several new versions with features that more carefully 
approximate human cognitive abilities (Shaoul & 
Westbury, 2010). 
Another approach to building semantic 
representations using passive co-occurrence is 
commonly referred to as Random Vector Accumulation 
models (e.g., BEAGLE; Jones & Mewhort, 2007). These 
models treat each word as a random vector (of arbitrary 
dimensionality) such that initially, dog and cat are 
represented as being no more similar to one another 
than are dog and bike. Then, each time a word is 
experienced, its representation is summed together with 
all of the other vectors in its context (e.g., with the 
vectors of all of the other words in the sentence). As a 
consequence, across learning, a word’s vector 
becomes a composite pattern of distributed activity 
reflecting its history of co-occurrence with other words. 
This means that, because dog and cat occur in similar 
contexts, across learning they move closer together in 
semantic space, whereas bike, due to not occurring in 
such similar contexts, moves further away. Thus, these 
models calculate “co-occurrence” differently than other 
models in that rather than calculating frequencies (i.e., 
rather than performing counts) to form semantic 
representations, they form representations by summing 
together all the vectors that constitute a word’s context. 
Although the passive models we have described 
learn from first-order co-occurrence, they are not limited 
to representing first-order statistical relationships. For 
example, the distributed representations of Random 
Vector Accumulation models such as BEAGLE end up 
having rich higher-order statistical relationships—even 
without direct co-occurrence, the model develops 
similar representations between words that appear in 
similar contexts. Thus, passive co-occurrence models 
show that sophisticated semantic representations can 
emerge via applying a simple Hebbian-based count to 
episodic co-occurrences. 
7.2. Latent Abstraction Models 
Latent Abstraction models also record the frequency 
of co-occurrence of words across linguistic contexts. 
However, rather than simply counting co-occurrences, 
they go a step further by reducing the dimensionality of 
the “episodic” matrix into an abstracted, lower 
dimensional “semantic” matrix. Hence, all models of this 
type posit a cognitive process that operates on episodic 
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experiences, reducing those experiences in such a way 
that it induces higher-order “latent” semantic 
relationships. Typically, latent abstraction models 
implement data reduction via mechanisms such as 
principal components analysis or factor analysis. 
Because latent abstraction models borrow dimensional 
reduction methods from statistics, they can only learn in 
batch—all episodic traces must first be represented 
before the learning mechanism can be applied (but see 
Olney, 2011). Thus, how they acquire semantic 
representations seems psychologically implausible. 
However, they are worth discussing because once the 
representations are acquired, the resulting 
representations appear to be quite plausible. 
The best-known latent abstraction model is Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). 
LSA begins with a word-by-document frequency matrix 
from a large text corpus. This is reduced into a 
semantic space in which two words can be very similar 
if they occurred in sufficiently similar contexts, even if 
they never directly co-occur (e.g., synonyms). The 
learning process in LSA is obviously not meant to 
simulate what humans do—we are unlikely to represent 
our lifetime of episodic experiences all at once and then 
factor that matrix. Landauer and Dumais were clear that 
humans do not use the same kind of dimensional 
reduction technique to learn semantics but, rather, that 
they use “some cognitive mechanism that achieves the 
same goal” (p. 218). While what that mechanism might 
be remains elusive, LSA has inspired many similar 
latent abstraction models (e.g. COALS; Rhode, 
Gonnerman, & Plaut, 2009) that have been among the 
most successful in the literature at explaining human 
data in a variety of semantic tasks. 
7.3. Predictive Models 
Members of the family of predictive distributional 
semantic models also produce abstract distributed 
representations of word meanings, but their learning 
mechanisms are based on predictive coding and error-
driven learning, two principles that are core to theories 
of reinforcement learning. Most of these models are 
connectionist in architecture. For example, early 
recurrent connectionist models such as those studied 
by St. John and McClelland (1990) and Elman (1990) 
learn a distributed pattern of elements across their 
hidden layers that reflects each word’s co-occurrence 
with other words (as in HAL, described earlier) in a 
continuous (technically, infinite) window. Rogers and 
McClelland (2004) likewise studied the ability of classic 
feedforward Rumelhart networks to learn distributed 
representations from simple languages, and found that 
very sophisticated (even hierarchical) higher-order 
relations naturally emerged after sufficient experience. 
Both recurrent (e.g., Elman, 1990) and feed-forward 
(e.g., Rogers & McClelland, 2004) supervised networks 
learn by feeding activation forward through the network 
to generate its predicted output, and then derive an 
error signal—the difference between the predicted 
output and the actual value observed in the training 
corpus. This signal is used to backpropagate 
(Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) the error through 
the layers of the network to increase the likelihood that 
the correct output will be predicted given the input in the 
future. While early predictive models produced 
interesting generalization behavior, they required many 
passes through the data to learn stable representations, 
and did not scale well beyond small artificial languages 
as effectively as did latent abstraction models such as 
LSA. Nonetheless, such models are interesting 
because by constraining the size of the hidden layers, 
they develop representations that are more akin to 
latent semantic variables (c.f. LSA) than to simple 
passive co-occurrence. 
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in 
predictive models of distributional semantics. Howard et 
al. (2011) trained a predictive version of the Temporal 
Context Model, a recurrent model of error-driven 
hippocampal learning, on a large text corpus and 
demonstrated impressive performance on word 
association tasks. The predictive Temporal Context 
Model associates local item representations to a 
gradually drifting representation of time (temporal 
context) to learn distributed semantic representations 
from a text corpus. Although it differs considerably from 
classic connectionist models in architecture, it shares 
the relation to error-driven reinforcement learning 
theories. 
A new type of model that has gained immense 
popularity recently due to its performance in the field of 
computational linguistics is the “neural embedding” 
model. Perhaps the best known is Google’s word2vec 
model (Mikolov et al., 2013), partially due to its 
remarkable performance on semantic tasks. But a key 
difference between this model and other systems led by 
industry (that are engineered to perform a single task 
well) is that word2vec is based on the same theoretical 
reinforcement-learning architecture that original 
recurrent language models were based on (Elman, 
1990). Word2vec is a predictive model with hidden and 
recurrent layers, very much like the predictive Temporal 
Context Model, but operating on discrete time steps. It 
uses several training “tricks” to scale up to extremely 
large word corpora that Elman’s (1990) networks were 
never able to. Word2vec has had a major impact on the 
machine learning literature because it outperforms 
every other semantic model on a large battery of 
semantic tasks while using an architecture on which the 
field was no longer focused (see Baroni et al., 2014 for 
a careful comparison of state-of-the-art co-occurrence 
models and word2vec). Hollis and Westbury (2016) 
recently explored the organizational principles that 
word2vec is discovering to construct its semantic 
representations, concluding that the model primarily 
converges on affective dimensions of language when 
constructing semantic representations, very much in the 
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spirit of Osgood’s early theories of meaning (Osgood, 
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Despite its excellent 
scaling properties and performance when trained on 
massive amounts of text, it remains to be seen if 
word2vec is an appropriate cognitive model of learning 
at human-like scales. For example, Asr, Willits, and 
Jones (2016) found that word2vec had much more 
difficulty learning simple semantic categories from child-
directed speech using the CHILDES corpus than did a 
simple principal components analysis-based latent 
abstraction model. 
An important benefit of predictive models is that they 
embody principles that seem to be ubiquitous within the 
cognitive system (cf. the recent interest on prediction 
during language comprehension, Altmann & Mirkovic, 
2009). Moreover, the simplicity of Elman’s (1990) 
recurrent network is inherently attractive because of its 
transparency regarding how, and what, it learns. 
However, the issue of scaling, both scaling up to 
realistically large adult-sized input, and scaling down to 
realistically small, child-sized input, is an important one. 
Being concerned with scaling is no different (for a 
cognitive psychologist) than being concerned with the 
hypothesis that links principles of learning and semantic 
organization to the architecture of the brain that 
embodies such principles. 
7.4. Bayesian Models 
Bayesian models of cognition have seen immense 
growth over the past decade, both due to their success 
at explaining human data across many cognitive levels, 
and because the approach offers a unifying theoretical 
framework to understand human cognition as rational 
probabilistic inference. The Bayesian approach 
assumes that the pattern of word co-occurrences 
across documents is generated by mixtures of semantic 
topics, where a topic is a probability distribution over 
words, and a word is a probability distribution over 
topics. The topics themselves are estimated from the 
observed data using Bayesian inference. 
It is helpful to think of topics as folders on a shelf, 
where each folder contains words that are most 
associated with that topic, and each possible topic has 
one folder. For example, reaching into the finance folder 
you are more likely to pull out words such as market, 
bank, or investment than giraffe, zebra, or hippo (this 
same principle underlies LSA, described earlier). 
Whereas all folders contain all words, their probabilities 
differ. Giraffe is much more likely to be pulled out of the 
zoo folder than is investment. In the model, it is 
assumed that documents were generated by weighted 
mixtures of these topic folders. A news article 
describing a new fertility drug may have been 
generated by a recipe that calls for a mix of topics 
including 1 part health, 2 parts pharmaceutical, a dash 
of reproduction, and a pinch of finance. This “recipe” 
example is a slight oversimplification of a graded 
process in that all topics may be sampled from, but their 
contributions are probabilistic. 
Hence, a topic model estimates the most likely set 
and mixture of topics that would have generated the 
text. When applied to a large general text corpus, the 
model presumably uncovers general semantic topics 
that represent the shared world knowledge across 
individuals. When applied to a more specific text 
corpus, a topic model can uncover the author-specific 
topics that are most likely to have generated the 
observed data; this type of analysis can be very useful 
to explore knowledge expertise. For example, Murdock, 
Allen, and DeDeo (2015) recently used topic models to 
explore Darwin’s reading notebooks, providing new 
insights about how his theory of natural selection 
emerged from the semantic path of his readings and 
writings. 
Topic models differ from traditional distributional 
semantic models in theoretically important ways that 
deserve some highlighting here. First, topic models are 
generative. They specify a process by which words in 
documents are generated as a pattern of topic mixtures. 
Whereas abstraction models such as LSA do uncover 
variance components representing word co-
occurrences in the text corpus, the process is more one 
of data mining and cannot easily be reversed to explain 
how future documents would be generated from the 
model. 
Second, whereas most distributional semantic 
models are geometric models that represent a word as 
a point in high-dimensional space, topic models 
represent words as probability distributions. As a result, 
topic models naturally represent asymmetric semantic 
relations that are seen in human data, but that are 
difficult to account for with geometric models. For 
example, in free association norms, asymmetries are 
common: baby is a much more likely response to stork 
than stork is to baby. In a spatial representation, 
however, the distance between baby and stork must be 
the same regardless of which one serves as the cue. 
This symmetry need not be the case in topic models, 
where p(baby|stork) > p(stork|baby). Griffiths Steyvers, 
and Tenenbaum (2007) demonstrate several examples 
of how topic models explain patterns of human 
semantic data that violate symmetry and cannot be 
explained by purely geometric models (but see Jones, 
Gruenenfelder, & Recchia, 2011). 
7.5. Retrieval-Based Models 
A final family of distributional semantic model has 
seen considerably less attention in the literature, but 
nonetheless deserves mention because members of 
this family make a radically different theoretical claim 
about semantic representation. Retrieval-based models 
essentially posit that there is no such thing as semantic 
memory, only episodic memory. Thus, they have 
considerable overlap with the exemplar-based models 
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introduced in Section 3.1 and in the chapter in this 
Handbook by Ashby and Valentin. 
In retrieval-based models, semantic representations 
are an artifact (i.e., an emergent property) of retrieval 
from episodic memory. Most models of this family posit 
that each experience with a word lays down a unique 
trace in episodic memory. When a word is encountered, 
all of its previous experienced contexts are reactivated, 
and the process of retrieval from episodic memory 
incidentally recruits episodes of contexts that are quite 
similar. The aggregate of all episodes in the retrieved 
representation (implemented as a multi-dimensional 
vector) contains higher-order relationships of semantic 
similarity. Even though two words (e.g., synonyms) may 
never have co-occurred in the same context, their 
retrieved vectors will be similar to each other. 
The constructed semantics model of Kwantes (2005) 
is an example of a retrieval-based version of LSA. This 
model is based heavily on Minerva 2 (Hintzman, 1986), 
a multiple-trace memory model that originally was 
designed as an existence proof that “schema 
abstraction”, that is, the process by which a prototype 
appears to be abstracted from exemplars (Posner & 
Keele, 1968), could be an emergent phenomenon from 
an episodic memory model. This was a significant 
demonstration because schema abstraction had been 
used as strong evidence of multiple memory systems—
both episodic and semantic systems, consistent with 
Tulving’s classic taxonomy. Kwantes’ constructed 
semantics model is similar to LSA, but the data 
reduction mechanism is a natural byproduct of episodic 
retrieval. In addition, the semantic representation itself 
is never stored; it simply is an emergent artifact of 
episodic retrieval. 
Retrieval-based models therefore have two major 
distinctions from all other distributional semantic 
models. First, semantic memory in these models does 
not exist as a stored structure; the model stores only 
episodes. This essentially is equivalent to storing the 
word-by-context matrix that is used as input to other 
models, such as LSA or Topics. Second, there is no 
abstraction mechanism when learning. In contrast to 
models such as LSA, Topics, BEAGLE, and word2vec 
that all apply a data reduction mechanism to construct 
an abstracted semantic representation for storage 
during input (singular value decomposition, Bayesian 
inference, backpropagation), retrieval-based models 
essentially do this at output. In other words, all other 
models place the abstraction at encoding, whereas 
retrieval models place abstraction at retrieval. In 
addition, the abstraction is not a purposeful mechanism 
per se. Instead, abstraction incidentally occurs because 
our memory retrieval mechanism is reconstructive. 
Hence, semantic memory in retrieval-based models is 
essentially an accident due to our imperfect memory 
retrieval process. 
7.6 Challenges for Distributional Semantic 
Models 
Despite their impressive success at accounting for 
human data, distributional semantic models face some 
challenges as psychological models of human semantic 
representation. First and foremost, they routinely are 
criticized because they learn exclusively from text, that 
is, they construct semantic representations by applying 
a processing mechanism to statistical regularities in 
how words are used in a text corpus. In contrast, 
human semantic representations are constructed from a 
lifetime of linguistic and perceptual experience. 
Perceptual information is an inherent part of the 
organization of human semantic memory, but much of 
this information cannot be learned from statistics in a 
text corpus—it must be learned from multisensory 
experience (see the chapter by Matheson & Barsalou). 
The challenge resulting from distributional semantic 
models being limited to text input however, is not a 
limitation of them as learning models per se, but is 
rather a limitation in the type of data we are currently 
able to feed to them. Hence, it is possible that a 
distributional semantic learning model could be applied 
to perceptual and motoric information as well as 
linguistic information to construct a more refined 
semantic representation, if we could get the model to 
“see”, etc. Indeed, such a suggestion was made in the 
discussion section of the original LSA article (Landauer 
& Dumais, 1997). Recent distributional semantic 
models have taken up this challenge, constructing joint 
probabilistic or composite semantic spaces that 
integrate complementary information sources from both 
linguistic and perceptual streams. “Perception” in these 
models is either represented using semantic feature 
norms (McRae et al., 2005; Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008), 
geon-based representations (Kievit-Kylar & Jones, 
2011), or computer vision algorithms applied to natural 
images (Bruni, Tran, & Baroni, 2014). For an extended 
discussion, see the chapter in this Volume by Cai and 
Vigliocco. Reasonable success has been observed in 
several theoretical frameworks, including Bayesian 
models (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009; Steyvers, 
2009), random vector models (Jones & Recchia, 2010), 
and retrieval-based models (Johns & Jones, 2012). It 
remains to be seen whether, by providing distributional 
semantic models with not only linguistic and perceptual 
information, but also the ability to interact with the 
environment (cf. autonomous robots), such models 
could mimic human representations not only with 
respect to processing (e.g., the predictions that they 
make) and organization (e.g., similarity space), but also 
with respect to format (e.g., with parts supporting action 
also representing action knowledge). 
A second challenge faced by distributional semantic 
models is that most do not reflect the evidence that the 
episodic and semantic systems are at least partially 
distinct (see Section 4). Some neurobiologically inspired 
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computational models of semantic memory, however, 
do posit some distinction between these systems, 
taking inspiration from the different computational 
properties of the neocortical and hippocampal 
structures that support memory (Howard, Shankar, & 
Jagadisan, 2011; Kumaran, Hassabis, & McClelland, 
2016; Kumaran & McClelland, 2012; McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Norman & O’Reilly, 
2003; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 
2017). Most of these models are based on 
Complementary Learning Systems theory (McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). According to this 
theory, episodic memory is supported by hippocampal 
structures that rapidly encode distinct episodes by 
means of large changes in connectivity within the 
hippocampus and between the hippocampus and 
neocortex. In contrast, semantic memory is supported 
by slower and smaller changes in neocortical 
connectivity that encode regularities encountered 
across multiple episodes. Although few of the models 
based on Complementary Learning Systems have been 
scaled up to cope with realistically-sized conceptual 
spaces (but see Howard et al., 2011), their role in 
potentially constraining psychological theories of 
semantic memory is undeniably important and 
highlights the value of using neurobiological 
considerations to shape computational models. 
7.7 Summary of Computational Models of 
Semantic Representation 
Because we have discussed some of the limitations 
of distributional semantic models, it might be tempting 
to think that these limitations, coupled with the diversity 
of the models, compromise their contribution to 
psychological theories of semantic memory. However, 
even the simplest computational models of learning, 
abstraction, and semantic representation (e.g. Elman’s 
recurrent network model; Elman, 1990) can strongly 
influence psychological theory. Concepts such as 
prediction, abstraction, generalization, latent variables, 
and semantic space can be better understood by 
having an implemented computational perspective on 
how they might arise in any computational system. And 
even if it seems implausible that people wait to process 
the input until all of it has been gathered (c.f. the Latent 
Semantic models described in Section 7.2), the idea 
that there exists latent structure is important when 
considering what is encoded in semantic memory, and 
how it might be derived from experience. Similarly, 
although the idea that there is no such thing as 
semantic memory per se (c.f. the Retrieval-Based 
models of Section 7.3) challenges classical 
interpretations of the distinction between experience 
and abstraction, the retrieval-based models that make 
this claim are conceptually similar to the exemplar-
based psychological models (Section 3.1) that posit that 
the process of retrieval, rather than encoding, may be 
responsible for how it is that people can generalize from 
one experience to another. Thus, even principles that, 
on the surface, seem psychologically unlikely may 
ultimately prove to inform our understanding of 
cognitive processing. Finally, the models inspired by 
Complementary Learning Systems theory (7.6) make 
clear that fully understanding semantic memory will 
require better knowledge of the relationship between it 
and episodic memory, as well as an understanding of 
the neurobiology. 
8. Semantic memory: A common 
thread, and a look ahead 
The idea of abstraction recurs throughout this 
chapter. This is appropriate because abstraction is 
arguably at the root of semantic knowledge. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we revisit some essential 
roles of abstraction and raise questions for future 
research. 
8.1 The roles of abstraction 
We have suggested that the process of abstraction 
is one that, supported by sensitivity to statistical 
regularities, allows people to form and store (or, on 
exemplar/retrieval-based models, allows us to compute 
at retrieval) “abstracted” semantic information from our 
experiences (Section 2). This abstracted information 
would reflect what is most common across our 
experiences with a given object or event, such that 
idiosyncratic properties, like a leaf sticking to your dog’s 
coat, would be minimized. It is through this kind of 
abstraction that we are able to discern what various 
objects and events have in common, and group them 
together into concepts. 
We also described abstraction in terms of levels of 
abstraction (Section 6). The idea here is that 
information may be represented with different degrees 
of precision or detail, with representations containing 
more detail being referred to as “less abstract” or “at 
lower levels of abstraction” and representations 
containing less detail being referred to as “more 
abstract” or “at higher levels of abstraction”. For 
example, knowing that something is a canary requires 
more detailed semantic knowledge than knowing that 
something is a bird. In hierarchical descriptions of 
semantic knowledge (Section 3.1), the levels in the 
hierarchy can also be thought of as levels of 
abstraction, with superordinate (i.e., more inclusive) 
levels in the hierarchy corresponding to higher levels of 
abstraction (Rosch, 1978). Evidence suggests that 
depending upon the level at which we classify things 
(e.g., classifying a labrador as either a dog or a living 
thing), we rely on different brain regions to varying 
degrees (Section 6; cf. Hsu et al., 2011). 
How are these different kinds of abstraction related? 
It is easy to imagine a model in which the way that the 
process of abstraction is implemented produces 
different levels of abstraction. For instance, it is possible 
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that sensitivity to statistical regularities across time not 
only allows us to derive information from across 
instances that is not apparent in any individual instance 
(as described in Section 2), but also that sensitivity to 
regularities across multiple features produces more 
complex relationships among features than could be 
apparent in any individual modality (Damasio 1989). 
Such sensitivities may result in higher level 
representations that have less perceptual detail and are 
further removed from the perceptual input in any single 
modality. Subsequently combining these higher level 
representations could produce yet higher level 
representations that even less directly reflect the 
unimodal perceptual input (for discussion, see Binder, 
2016). Thus, sensitivity to cross-modal regularities 
could produce multiple levels of abstraction. 
An important open question is how this cross-modal 
integration process might happen. In particular, to what 
extent does “the integration of multiple aspects of 
reality... depend on the time-locked co-activation of 
geographically separate sites of neural activity within 
sensory and motor cortices...” (Damasio, 1989, p. 39)? 
Interesting areas of research are the possible roles of 
various frequency bands when considering 
synchronous neural activity, and the possible roles of 
coherent oscillatory activity in integrating information 
from distributed brain regions (Singer & Gray, 1995). 
Several researchers have been exploring this question 
with respect to auditory and visual information 
(Widmann et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2008; 
Bastiaansen et al., 2008; Van Ackeren & 
Rueschemeyer 2014). 
8.2 Can abstraction help explain the 
representation of abstract concepts and 
features? 
We would be remiss to leave the topic of abstraction 
without considering an important type of semantic 
knowledge that we have not yet considered--knowledge 
about abstract concepts. So far, we have focused on 
what might be termed “simple concepts”, that is, the 
kind of object and action concepts that we learn early 
on during development, and that we use in our basic 
interactions with the world. However, concrete concepts 
can contain features (e.g., the functions of many 
objects, such as used to tell time) that do not have 
obvious sensorimotor correlates. Similarly, much of our 
language is about concepts that have no physical 
manifestation, such as intellectual discourse or 
presidential debates. What sensory or motor attributes, 
or abstraction across those attributes, might constitute 
our representations of purpose or hope, concepts that 
seem to be devoid of physical and perceptual 
instantiation? 
The predominant theory of how abstract concepts 
are represented emphasizes the importance of 
emotional or affective information in their representation 
(Vigliocco et al., 2009). Neural investigations have 
provided support for this idea in that brain regions 
associated with emotion processing are more active 
when processing abstract than concrete words 
(Vigliocco et al., 2014). However, while this account 
may help explain the representation of abstract 
concepts that do indeed involve emotion (e.g., love), 
many abstract concepts are not as clearly associated 
with emotion (e.g., purpose). It has therefore been 
suggested that abstract concepts for which emotional 
and/or sensory and motor attributes are lacking are 
more dependent on linguistic (Paivio 1991), and 
contextual/situational information (Barsalou & Wiemer-
Hastings, 2005). That is, their mention in different 
contexts (i.e., episodes) may gradually lead us to an 
understanding of their meaning in the absence of 
sensorimotor content (Pulvermuller, 2013). Neural 
investigations have supported at least the linguistic 
portion of this proposal. Brain regions known to support 
language show greater involvement during the 
processing of abstract relative to concrete concepts 
(see Wang et al., 2010, for review). 
If contextual/situational information and linguistic 
information (including verbal labels) are indeed 
important components of abstract knowledge, these 
should serve as important inputs into the process of 
abstraction that we have already described. Although 
we focused on sensorimotor inputs in our prior 
descriptions of this process, in principle it should 
function over any input from which statistical regularities 
can be derived. In fact, the computational models 
described in Section 7 are a testament to the ability of 
abstraction processes to function over non-
sensorimotor input. 
8.3 Is there differential reliance on different 
types of semantic information across 
development and across levels of 
abstraction? 
The question of whether abstract knowledge relies 
more on linguistic or situational information compared to 
concrete concepts raises the question of whether other 
aspects of semantic knowledge also rely more on some 
types of information more than others. For instance, as 
discussed in Section 5.1, labels may serve as an 
“invitation to form categories” in that they encourage 
attending to commonalities between things that share 
the same label (Waxman & Markow, 1995). It is 
therefore possible that for categories for which the 
commonalities among instances are particularly hard to 
identify (such as superordinate categories, like “animal” 
or “tool”), labels may play a particularly important role in 
that without them, the commonalities would go 
unnoticed. Relatedly, it is possible that one reason that 
superordinate categories are later to develop is that 
they are particularly dependent on the ability to focus on 
specific aspects of a representation (e.g., the label), 
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and the ability to focus in this way depends on 
prefrontal cortex, the brain region that takes longest to 
develop (see Sloutsky, 2010 for discussion). It will be 
interesting to discover whether the development of 
prefrontal cortex indeed influences the extent to which 
children rely on labels versus sensorimotor information 
when learning new semantic knowledge (see Section 
4). 
9. An integrated memory system  
The data and theories that we have discussed in this 
chapter show that semantic memory should not be 
considered as fully independent from either episodic or 
implicit memory. In this section, we first review the 
evidence that semantic memory is part of an integrated 
memory system, and we then consider an implication of 
this integration. 
9.1 Episodic, implicit, and semantic 
memories 
There are several reasons to believe that episodic 
memory is an important component of semantic 
memory. First, without a functioning episodic memory, 
acquiring new semantic knowledge is slow and 
laborious, suggesting that episodic memory typically is 
important for the development of semantic knowledge 
(Section 4). Second, for most concepts, the acquisition 
process begins with a specific episode, although that 
episode may not later be consciously linked to the 
concept. This means that early in the process of 
learning about a new object, our knowledge may be 
heavily (or at least more heavily than later) influenced 
by episodic information. Conversely, there is evidence 
that our semantic knowledge supports our ability to 
acquire new episodic information (Kan et al., 2009). Our 
everyday experience is thus due to an interplay 
between episodic and semantic memory (see Altmann, 
2017, for an account of this interplay in the context of 
language and event comprehension). 
Exemplar/retrieval-based models of semantic memory 
blur the distinction further, essentially eliminating 
semantic representations and instead positing that 
semantic knowledge is an emergent property of the 
process of retrieving episodes (see Sections 3.1 and 
7.5). 
Unlike episodic memory, implicit memory is typically 
defined as knowledge that we never had conscious 
access to, but nevertheless affects our responses (e.g., 
procedural knowledge, such as how to ride a bike, or 
perceptual priming whereby our response to a stimulus 
is facilitated by prior exposure to a related stimulus, 
despite that fact that we are not aware of the 
relationship). By positing that the sensory and motor 
regions that are active when we perceive or interact 
with an object also have a role in representing it, 
sensorimotor-based models of semantic memory make 
clear predictions that implicit knowledge has a role in 
semantic knowledge. For instance, according to 
sensorimotor-based models, knowledge that is not easy 
to verbalize, such as how to ride a bike, can be part of 
your representation of bike, and how you position your 
hand and fingers while using a pencil can be part of 
your representation of pencil. Similarly, sensorimotor-
based models posit that similarity based on implicit 
knowledge, such as how objects are manipulated, 
should shape how semantic knowledge is organized, an 
assertion for which ample evidence exists (e.g., Myung 
et al., 2006). 
9.2 Do concepts really change across time 
and differ between individuals? 
Sensorimotor-based models of semantic memory 
are committed to representations being experience-
based. And experiences necessarily differ across time 
and across individuals. This may seem to create a 
problem for sensorimotor-based models because most 
people have the intuition that their semantic 
representations are static, and that when they talk to 
others about them, they are talking about the same 
things. We suggest that both of these intuitions are 
false (albeit not entirely false). First, given that semantic 
representations necessarily change across 
development (see Section 4), we must at least accept 
changes then. This raises the question of when, if ever, 
development should be considered to end, and, 
relatedly, how to consider the changes that result from 
the acquisition of new, or more detailed semantic 
knowledge in adulthood. Second, as described in 
Section 5, there are clear individual differences in the 
representation of semantic knowledge that result from 
individual differences in the experiences that make up 
both our episodic memories and our implicit memories. 
Despite these differences, we still (usually) seem to 
be referring to approximately the same things when we 
refer to an apple (whether the same goes for more 
abstract concepts like justice is open to debate). We 
suggest that the commonalities in human experience, 
due in part to the commonalities in the structure of the 
world in which we live, and in part to our common 
sensory and motor systems, allow our semantic 
representations, and the labels that refer to them, to be 
similar enough for successful communication (for 
further consideration of this point, see Casasanto & 
Lupyan, 2015; Connell & Lynott, 2014; Taylor & Zwaan, 
2009; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). Moreover, if, as 
suggested by Complementary Learning Systems 
theory, semantic memory changes slowly via small 
changes in neocortical connectivity, we need not worry 
that sudden changes in our experiences will radically 
alter our conceptual knowledge. Rather, we would 
expect changes due to experience to build gradually as 
our experiences accumulate. Thus, an integrated model 
of the semantic memory system must take account of 
the episodic and the implicit knowledge that influence 
semantic memory across the lifespan. 
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10. A final note 
The study of semantic memory is more than just the 
study of what we know and how we know it. To the 
extent that our knowledge shapes who we are, it is the 
study of who we are and why. A lesson to be learned 
from the insights that underpin the theories, data, and 
models that we have described is that our 
understanding of human memory relies on 
complementary investigations into behavior, 
neurobiology, and computation. Moreover, each of 
these perspectives is strengthened by considering the 
transition from the immature state to its mature 
counterpart. The challenge is to develop a model of 
human memory that reflects, across the lifespan, both 
the computations afforded by its neurobiology as well 
as the behaviors that these computations produce. 
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